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MARKETING AND SURVIVAL
STRATEGIES OF GULF SEAPORTS:
A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS
E. Cameron l\'illia,m
Donald R. Gibson

Introduction
The seaports of the Gulf Coast have hi~torit:ally represented a \'aluable
economic resour,e for the region. A t:on,iderablc body of research has demonstrated the role of deepwater ~eaports in generating economic activity, both
directly, in the seaport city itself. and indirectly, in the hinterland served by
the port. In cities ~uch as New Orleans. Houston, and Mobile. the port and
its related bu~inesses ha\'e pro\ ided a ,ignificant proportion of local busines, and per~onal income.
Rccen1 trends in ocean transportation arc changing traditional ways of doing business for seaport,. These trends. which are interrelated. are: deregulation of transportation: intermodalism: the increasing co,t of operating
modern vessels: and the development of the "land britlge" and "load center"
.:oncept,. These developments have implications which are largely negative
for Gulf seaports.
This paper ,ummari1e, these trend, and their wntext, analyzes their implil:ations for Gulf seaports, reports research which identifies alternative
strategies port administrator, are employing to cope\\ ith them, anti suggests
area, for further research.

The Economic lmpacl of Sraport,
It has long been noted that the prc,ence of a dcepwater ti:rminal in a com•
munity ha, a bendicial economic impact through the creation of employment and entrepreneurial opportunities. Since marine cargo operations were
until quite recently labor intensi\e, the bulk of thi~ impact wa\ rcali1ed from
\\aterfront employment of long~horcmcn. Other source, induded the provision of a wide varier~• of gootl~ and sen ice~. E,amplcs inclutle: pilotage:
stevedoring services: compa~~ adju~tment: deck, engine. and cabin stores;
fuel and water: and repair~ .
To rocus on longshore employment, it 5hould be rcalilcd that until late
in the laM century, all cargo \\a~ break-bulk cargo: that i~. pad.aged in crates,
bales, or barrels, and loaued and di~1.:hargcd using method, which were laborintensive. Thu5, a seaport wa\ indifferent, from an economic viewpoint, to
the types of cargo it a11racted. ~ince nearly all cargoe, were handled similarly. Thi~ began to change around the turn of the century with the invention
of the ocean-going tanker, followed by the development of bulk-handling
methods for tlry cargoes such a~ grain and coal. Atlvances in intermodal-
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ism, beginning in the l 950's, initiated a more drastic decline in break-bu!!._
cargoes as general cargo of all ,orts began to be containerized.
By 1988, 82 percent of liner cargo in the ocean-borne foreign trade or the
United States wa\ containeriLed, an increase of 7 .5 percent from the previous year (MARAD 1989a). This continues an apparently-inexorable trend
toward the containerization of virtually all liner cargoes. Figure I ,ho"' containerization' s actual ,hare of all liner cargoes frorn 1970 through 1988. It
should be noted that containerized cargo not only ha, increased every year
in relative terms, it ha~ increased in ahsolute terms even in year\ of \lagnation or decline in liner cargo overall.
l\lan y past studies of the economic impact of a \Capon have focused nn
aggregate tonnage of cargo movements through a port, regardle" of form.
As suggested ahove, this ~hould have made li11le difference until the advent
of specialized bull._ handling method\ and, especially, the recent explo~ive
growth in containerization. Nov.. however, it i!> important to separate breakbulk, interrnodal, and bull._ cargoes in any ,uch analy~i\.
A recent study (Yochum and Agarwal I 98·H did this in examining the economic: impact of Virginia's seaport, on the state's economy. The author,
found that, in terms of c:mployment:
-break-bulk cargo generated $105.33 of payroll per ton and one joh
for every 175 ton, of cargo;
-containeri7cd cargo created $77.4-l or payroll per ton and one job
for every 239 tons of cargo;
-coal created a job for every :!,03R ton, mined in Virginia and ,hipped
through Virginia port, along with $7.66 of payroll for every ton of
coal;
-grain wa~ re,ponsible for generating one job for every 2,071 tom
of cargo a, well a, $9. 79 of payroll per ton or grain moving through
the port.
In addition, other re,enue generated at the port for each ton amounted
to $18.84 for buli._ cargo, $71.67 for container cargo, and $9.73 for breai._hulk cargo. Thi, rc,enue ,,a~ earned by local tran~portation, vessel, terminal, and governmem 5ervice~ 5Upporting pon operation~. The\e data are \Ulllmariled in Tahle I.
While the~e daca an· for one particular port, it is rea,onahle to a~,umc
that at lea~, the order, or magnitude of the difference~ in r.:,enue by cargo
type ,, ill be roughly corm ant aero,, all U.S. port~. including Gulf porh.
Ir will be noted that breai._-huli._ cargo gencrat.:s by far the large,, rc,enue.
There are 1,,0 reawn, for thi,. First. hrcai._-buli._ vessels load and di,charge
smaller amount, of cargo relative to port ~cn,ices recehed than l!ither container or bulk vessels. Second. breakhulk cargo is by far the moq laborintensive or the three types. generating many more dollar~ per ton in longshore payroll than the other two.
In summary, brcakbulk cargo ha5 the greatest economic impact on a port
community, followed hy container cargo; bull._ cargoe, have the smallest positive economic impact. Thus, the trends in Gulf pore, - the relative shrini._agc of both brcakbulk and containerized cargoes, with only bulk cargoes
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having a positive growth outlooi,,, - are having and will continue 10 ha,e
significant negative effect~ on maritime-related busincs\ and employment in
these cities. Each of thesl' trt:nd~ is briefly de~nibed belo,,.

lnh'rmodali~m
Generally \peaking, any tra11 sfer of goods bcrneen two mode~ of tran,portation, hoY.ever accompli,hed. i\ an intermodal transfer (f--1ahoney 1985).
However. in common usage, the term usually mean~ the de,elopmcnt of system\ for rntionali1ing and facilitating intcrmodal 1ran~fers. Of the~c systems,
the onl' ,,hkh ha\ had the mo\l profound effect on global logistics is containerization.
Briefly. containerization irnolvcs the u,c of \landard-~i,ed steel containers ,,hich ,;an be quidly transfcrrc<l bctY.een rail. highway. and ocean ,;arriers, using special container-handling equipment and vehicles. As an
illustration of the pro<lui:1ivi1y incrl'ascs brought about by con1aincri,a1ion,
a single crane operator, assisted by a handful of spo11er~ and yard drivers.
can load or di\chargc as nrn,·h cargo in containers in 15 minutes as a gang
or 20 or more long5horemcn. handling brcal,,,bull,,, cargo. can accomplish in
an entire working <lay.
Thi5 additional pro<luctidty come~ at the C05t of innca~ed capital investment; hoY.evcr, full enjoyment of the bcncfit5 of con1aineri,a1ion requires
special terminals, rnntainer handling equipment, and vesseh. Nevertheless,
liner 5tearmhip companie\, reacting to 5hipper prcfl!rence for the advantages
in spce<l, wnvcnicnce, and reduced <lamage and pilferage containerilation
enjoys O\er break-bull,,,, have in,este<l mas5i"ely in containerization over the
past twenty years. Beginning Y.ith high-unit value. high-value-a<l<led cargoe5
and working downward, virtually every !,,,ind of cargo \\hich mO\cs in liner
service ha5 been contai neri Lc<l.
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At the port level. traditional waterfronts do not readily lend themselves
to the requirements of container operations because of the land required;
a rule of thumb is that a minimum of ,e.,,en acres of paved container marshalling area is required for each container-vessel berth. Thi~ has promoted
the gro\\th of container terminab in areas remote from traditional waterfronts, and ha~ hampered the develor,ment of container operations in the
major U.S. gulf port~ of Houston, New Orleans. and Mobile. In addition,
at least one, and ideally two, container crane, are needed per berth, at a cost
of 5 to 10 million dollar, each. Al~o co~tly is the speciali£ed container-handling
equipment. ,uch as the stradd le-true!,., which can stacl,. containers five-high,
\\hich is essential for maximum ulilirntion of the facility.
E,en when port, in the Gull have been willing to make thi~ inve,tment,
other factors, ,uch as the co,t of wssel operation5 and the rise of mini-landbridge services, have made it difficult for them to attract container service.

Drrej!ulation and Landhridl!e Senk<·
The deregulation of transportation in the United States, culminating with
the Shipping Act of 1984, ha, had profound effect, on tra1hportation in
general, and port de,elopment in particular. The most important development. from the point of view of Gulf ports, has been the greater freedom
of steamship companie~ to is,ue ocean bill, of lading from any point. including inland points, and ro mc other modes of iransportation. Thb has
led to the dc,elopment of the "mini-land bridge." (Thi, term is an oft\hoot
of the concept of the "landbridge"
for e\ample, transporting cargo
originating in Japan and destined for Europe by ship 10 the \\'e~t Coast of
the U.S., by rail to an fat'>! Coa,t port. and by 5hip again the balance of
the ,oyage, thu~ avoiding 1he Panama Canal transit and saving time and
di,tancc).
Mini-landbridgc operations allcrn a \tcam,hip company to issue an ocean
bill of lading from a port at which its \hip, do not actually call, and rail
or road thc cargo to another port for loading on one of the company\ ships
(the re\t:=r,e takes place for inbound cargo). lncenti,es for \tcarmhip companic\ to do thi, ari,c from lower road and rail freight rate.,. due to deregulation , and higher \essel operating co,ts which enrnuragc minimizing the
number of port calls.
l\lini-landbridge service ha, depri\cd Gulf porh of container service betwei:n both Europe and the l·ar East, representing the bull,. of U.S. foreign
trade. A, an example, a large U.S. flag container operator offered service
to all major Gulf ports - but it, vc,sel5 ne,er en1crcd the Gulf. Imtead,
thi, cargo \\a, railed to Sa\annah. The Port of Savannah. in trade advertisements, has bilkd itself (somewhat tongue-in-cheek) a\ the "fastest-growing
port in the Gull."
The impact on Gulf port, can be ,ecn from rc.:cnt ,olume 5tatistics. Over
1he three-year period 1986-1989, inclusive. Iota! U.S. "aterbornc foreign commerce grt:Y. by 17 percent, and by 22 percent for the Gulf region. Ho"ever.
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while the liner segment of that trade grew by about 11 percent for the U.S.,
it grew by less than I. 7 pc:rcent for the Gulf region. Between 1987 and I 988,
containerized liner cargoes handled by Gulf region seaports declined by 12
percent. While the Gulf ports' share of total U.S. watc:rborne foreign commerce has remained constant at about 40 percent from 1984 through 1988,
the region's share of liner cargoes has declined from 18 percent to 14 percent over the same period (American Association of Port Authorities 1989).
Such a decline can be fully explained only by the growth in land-bridged
cargo bound for destinations in what was once the traditional hinterlands
of Gulf seaport s.
The innovation of the "double-stack" train (a special railcar on which
ocean containers may be stacked two-high) provided the productivity boost
which made mini-landbridge service take off. The first such train operated
early in I 984. By 1989, one steamship company alone was operating more
than 600 of its own special railcars, with 38 departures per week from major
west coast ports to Houston, Ne..., Orleans, Memphis, and Atlanta, as well
as major midwestern and northeastern cities. These are unit trains, each hauling as many a s 280 full -sized ocean containers. (American President Lines
1988). At last count, more than a half-dozen steam~hip companies, both
American and foreign, \\ere offering similar service from the west coast, ,erving the Far East - U.S. trades. Several other companies offer similar serv ice via East coast pom (including Savannah) in the Europe-U .S. trades.
Ports, such a~ Long Beach (California) and Savannah, service hugh hinterlands through the use of mini-landbridge services and are known as "loadcenter ports"; and the trend among container operators toward calling at
fewer and fewer ports is called " load-centering."

Co'it of Vess(') Operations
Along with containerization of general rargo has come a trend toward larger, faster, and more expensive vessels. This trend is by no means confined
to container operations; in breakbulk cargo, there ha~ been a trend away
from conventional geared (self-unloading) vessels to roll on/ roll off ~hips
which are larger and more expensive than those they replaced.
Dail~ operating cosb, plus the variable costs associa1ed with a porl ..:all
(pilotage, fees, etc.}, are compared by the ship operator to the marginal
revenue likely to he deri ved from the port call in order to determine the economic feasibility of calling at any given port. Operating costs have risen drastically. In I 989, the average daily operaong cost o f 25.(>00 dwt containership
wa~ $100,189, as compared to $26,655 per day for a general ..:argo ship of
about I 5,500 dwt (average size for respective vessel type (MA RAD J989b)).
The amount of revenue, and thu~ cargo, needed to justify a port ..:all has
risen accordingly. Twenty year~ ago, one of the author5 observed that thr:
scheduling of ports for call s by conventional break bulk vessels ...,as induced
in practice by as little a~ ten tons of cargo. By contrast, a recent study surveyed steamship companies to ascertain the volume of cargo neccs~ary to
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induce calls at a particular Gulf port; the responses ranged from several
hundred to a thousand tons, and from $40,000 to $ I 50,000 in revenue, per
call (PRC Harris I 983).
Therefore, the economics of modern container operations can result in
a decision not to call at any Gulf port, but to serve the region instead by
mini-landbridge, as in the example already ciced. Con~ider a hypothetical
steamshi p company in the tran~-at Ian tic trade, operating 18-k noc containerships with a cotal operational cost-per-day of $100,000. Calling at Gulf ports
as opposed co land-bridging cargo co Savannah adds nearly 1,000 naucical
miles, or about cwo and one-quarter sceaming days of more chan $250,000
in operacing coses for a call at Mobile (Che easternmo~t major Gulf lines cargo port) alone, plus port costs. A similar calculation for cranspacific service, comparing landbridge service vs. the all-v.ater route through the Panama Canal co Gulf ports, would show even more dramatic cost differences.
Coping Strat(•gic~ or Gulf Port!>

Port managers and local authorities in che Gulf arc, of course, cognizanc
of chcsc trends. Depending upon the -:ircumstances of each port, a variety
of coping Mratcgies appear to have evolved, a, identified by the author~ during
che course of recent exploratory research. The research mcchodology invohed
in-depth interviews with key managl.'.rs for port authoricic, in seaporb of che
Souch Aclantic and Gulf regions. Re,ponscs v.crc obtained from senior
management representacives of c, ery port wich che capabilicy of handling
deep draft vessels from Hampton Roads, Virginia, to Brov.ns\'ille. Texas,
inclusi,e. Striking differences in marketing scratcgies and market ouclook\
were noted between Souch Aclancic and Gull port\, for many of chc reasom
-:itcd above. South Atlantic port, ancicipated o,crall growth in cheir range,
and planned marketing scratcgics incended to maintain or increase cheir market shares; their outlooi.. ,,as generally optimistic.
Gulf port managers. on Che other hand. Y.cre pessimistic. and focused o n
survival or "zero-sum-game'' strategies. While the marketing/survival ,tratcgy of each Gulf port ,,a~ unique in detail, \omc common factors emerged.
The author, ,,ere thu~ able to identify ~everal generic "coping" ~trategies
evolving in the Gulf range of ports. Some ports concentrate on one of the~e
strategie~, other~ pur\ue mo or more ~imultancously. These strategics are
briefly outlined below (confidentiality consideration, preclude going into
greater detail).

"Z(•ro-Sum Game" Strategies with Regard to Contain{'r Trame
Gulf ports which ha"e invesced heavie~t in containcri.rntion ha\'e de, eloped
marketing ~trategies Y.hich focu~ on competing more effectively or aggrc\sively with neighboring ports, thus capturing a larger share, at competitors'
expense, of a market acknowledged to be static or shrinking. Realizing that
there is no \uch thing a~ a captive hinterland, these ports position thern~elve\
a\ the optimal call for a steamship com pany pursuing a strategy of offering
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container service into the Gulf but minimizing port calls, for the financial
reasons already cited. Houston and New Orleans both aggressively promote
their container terminals. This \trategy is by no means confined to the larger
ports, however. A very much smaller port - Gulfport. Mississippi - positioned itself as an alternate single call to separate calls at both New Orlea11->
and Mobile, with some succe,s. Of the major Gulf ports. only Mobile \Cems
to have focused its primary marketing effort on other than the container
market.

"Markel Nichcr" Strate~ics
These arc strategies which focu~ on becoming technical and marketing
specialists in certain specialized kind, of cargo. The small ports of Pen~acola and Corpus Christi have both aggressively sought to incrca~e traffic in
bagged agricultural producb, principally foreign-aid cargoes, w11h ~ome success. This clas5 of cargo has the advantage of being both profitable and lahorin1 ensive, and thus having a larger-than-average positive economic impact
on a port. Success factor, for s uch a strategy include favorable accc~, to inland transportation modes. and efficiency and productivity in cargo handling.
Mobile. a larger port, includes a "nicher" ,trategy in its overall market ing plan. A recent marketing initiative by the Alabama State Dods (ASD)
10 attract more hreal--bull- specialty cargoes such a~ ~teel pipe and fore\l
products ha~ met with ,ome succe~s. As a result, ASD ha, begun de,eloping
a ne\\ break-bull- terminal facility e~pecially dc,igne<l for these two cargo
cat egories.
One ohvious dra,, bad, of thb ~trategy is the vulnerability of the port to
cnv,ronmcntal change~ affecting its narro,, market niche. For example.
change~ in foreign aid policy could greatly impact the a\ailability of hagged
agricultural good for export. Changes in wpply and demand, or in currency
values , could affect the demand for ,tecl pipe or fore~t producb, and thu,
their a,ailability a., cargoc~.
Ano ther danger lie, in the trend illu,trated in Figure I; only a break-bulk
cargo wch a'> a large ,teel pipe, which c.:annot fit into an ocean container,
seem ,afe from thi~ tendency. It ,eem, clear tha t e,entually, a, the produc11vi1y of container operation~ imprmes and the indmtr~ gro,,s ever more
co mpetitive, every cargo \\hich lllO\CS in liner trade and can be made to fit
int o a n ISO container will be containerized. bcn out,ized ca rgo may not
be safe for break -bulk operation~; the pattern of de, eloping special containers for targeted cargoe, (e.g., refrigerated, tank. "high-cube'' containers)
offer5 an ominous parallel.

The Bulk Car(.!O Straleg}
This is the ,trategy Mobile ha~ pur~ued until recently, spurred in part by
the de, elopment of the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway, resulting in more
than 80 percent of the revenue of the Alabama State Docks coming from
bulk cargoes. However, the port is ~omewhat diversified, retaining bimonthly
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container service, as well a, ~ome breakbulk liner service. Also, as noted
above, it also pursues a "nicher" strategy" ith respect to ~tee) pipe and forest
products export~. A drawbad, of the bulk strategy. as already discussed, is
that bulk cargoes have the smallest economic impact on the port community, resulting in the paradox of record tonnages for the Alabama State Docks
existing side by 5ide with a deeply depre,sed Mobile maritime industry.

Dl',oting Port Propl'rt~ to Alternathe U,l'~
l\lany ,mailer, and some larger, port\ arc seriously con,idering abandoning the effort to compete in favor of devoting v.aterfront land and fadlities
to other, totally unrelated use~. i\s the ,upply of undeveloped waterfront
property near urban area, a\ailable for recreational, re~idential, and other
non-indu,trial use:, has declined, the \ alue of industrial waterfront with
redevelopment possibilities ha, climbed. Port, on all three coasts have ,cen
indu,trial waterfront redeveloped into upscale condm, ,hopping centers, and
recreation are.is. Baltimore';, Inner Harbor, Norfolk\ Waterside, Nc\1
Orleam' Riverwalk, and other similar projects ha,·e presented appealing altcrnatil'cS 10 manager, of unprofitable marine terminal facilities. Therefore,
the po,sibility exists that ,omc ,malkr cities, with ,truggling port operations,
"ill simply cea,e 10 be ,eaport~. Recently, the Pcn~acola (Florida) City Council narrowly defeated a motion 10 shut do\\ n the port (a city department)
anti develop the city's waterfront for recreational and other uses. /\, the value
of waterfront property for non-maritime purpose, incrca,es and port revenue
decreases, this type of development will become an increa,ingly ;tttractive
option for many ,mailer ports.
None of these strategies is optimum in term~ of enhancing or repladng
the income dcril'cd from ocean terminal operations in seaport communities,
but port planners arc handicapped by both a lack of adequate information
about their competitive environment, and a lack of publi,hed guidance in
the still-ne1\ area of ,trategic marketing planning for ,eaporh.

Implicit in the coping strategic~ enumerated above is the as~umption that
present adverse t rcntls are permanent. irre\ ersiblc, and beyond the capability of indil'itlual port<, to remedy. Thi5 a5sumption is by no mean, proven,
anti research is needed to prOI idc more information on\\ hich port\ can base
~ound policy and watcgy decisiom.
One area may be an examination of the extent to which the adverse trend,
identified arc fundamental and long-la,ting, a\ oppmcd to the effcl·ts that
temporary factors such a, the strong dollar, imbalances in U.S. trade with
the Far Ea~t anti Europe, and the depression in the U.S.-South American
trade may be having.
A not her area for investigation is the possibility that innovative stratcgie5
for Gulf port\ can mitigate the negative effects of, or even reverse, one or
more of the adl'erse trends identified. For example, the North Carolina State
1he
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Pons authority has enjoyed (until recent reverses) some ,uccess in compet ing with Hampton Roads and Charle,ton due to its Charlotte I ntermodal
Terminal, which, in effect, moved the port of Wilmington inland to a more
favorab le conjunction" ith inland modes of transportation. Using a ., imilar
trategy to compete vvith the Port of 13altimorc, the Virginia Port, Authority just established an inland intermodal terminal at Front Royal, Virginia.
This terminal has a direl:t rail link to Norfolk for regularly-scheduled unit
container trains (as did Charlotte with \.\' ilmington). Although it i~ too early
10 gauge the succes, of Virginia's inland terminal, early indicatiom arc
favorab le.
ls this 111nova11on transferable to one or mon: Gulf ports? Likely candidates would seem to include Birmingham (for the port of l\lobilc) and Dalla,Fort Worth (for the ports of Hou,ton and / or Gahe\ton) . Research is needed to det ermine the factor, governing the utility of such facilities in allowing
ports to co mpete succes~fully.
Fin all), is it feasible for a Gulf port to become a terminu, for a nC\\. a,
yet undevelo ped land bridge, such a, one het\H'cn the Far Ea,t and porh
in the Caribbean or the cast coast of South America? Or wc,tcrn Canada
and the ea, t coast of South America? What strategie~ might a Gulf port me
in promo ting such a land bridge to shippers, steamship lines. and railroad,?
These and othe r possibilitie, require investigation by rc,carch..:rs in the area,
of marketing, economics, transportation, and international businc,,.

S ummar) and Cond u,ion,
The rbe 111 load-center and mini-land bridge opi.:rations in ocean liner ,en i\:e
are the n:,ult o f sc\cral interrelated trend, in ocean ~hipping, and ha, had.
a nd 11111 ..:on11nuc to have, negative impact~ nn U.S. seaport, 111 thl' Gulf of
l\k,ico. Coping strategic, ha\c l'\ oh ed through thl' effort~ of indi\ idual
po rt~. but a rc belie\Cd 10 he ,uhoptimal due to a lack of information on \\ hich
to base ,ound ~trategic planning. Rc~earch b badly nl·cdcd in thi, area.
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